









The year 1920 plays key a role in memory politics in East-Central European 
countries, too. Reconstruction had already been under way at some places and 
in newly annexed areas new authorities began to establish themselves. Else-
where, for instance in Polish, Ukrainian and Belarussian areas, military oper-
ations had yet to end. Moreover, the border between Poland and Lithuania, as 
well as Poland and Germany (in Eastern Prussia) were uncertain, while Silesia 
(Śląsk in Polish and Schlesien in German) was in upheaval and the future of Fi-
ume had yet not to be settled. Thus, it is not surprising that the events that took 
place a hundred years ago are among the most salient questions for historical 
research and memory politics. In this paper, we survey these in the form of brief, 
country-specific summaries. 
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“Czechoslovakians” and the Memory of “Year 0”
28 October, the day of the declaration of the Czechoslovak Republic in 
Prague was a national holiday of Slovaks during the interwar period. Fol-
lowing the fall of state socialism and the disintegration of Czechoslovakia 
in 1993, for nearly three decades, it was only the Czechs who officially cele-
brated it. We shall mention that, starting from the 1990s, there were members 
of the Slovakian political elite who kept proposing that it should also be-
come a national holiday in Slovakia. Although the place of Slovakia within 
Czechoslovakia is often the matter of debate, the most relevant arguments 
for seeing 28 October as a turning point in Slovak national history are the 
following: Slovaks became a constitutive nation of a state in October 1918. 
This was the first time that its boundaries had been marked. Moreover, the 
Czechoslovak state was the one that made it possible to lay the foundations 
of the economic, social and cultural modernity of today’s Slovakia. Novem-
ber 2020 brought about a major change in this debate: the Slovak Parliament 
voted in favour of adding 28 October to the list of national days even though 
it did not become a holiday. 
Banner of the Republic of Czechoslovakia with the script ”truth shall be victorious” 
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It is widely known that 1918 was a turning point in the history of the Czech 
nation as it was no less than the renewal of Czech statehood. Czechoslovakia 
was one of the most democratic political systems of the Central European 
region at the time. This also means that for the Czech society and political 
elite the jubilee in 2018 had major importance, while the 100th anniversary 
of the Trianon Treaty caused less excitement among academics and in public 
life. In Slovakia, the situation was quite different. 
There, the frame within which Slovaks interpreted the Trianon question 
shifted as a result of a large event on 2 June 2020 when Prime Minister Igor 
Matovič received a hundred ethnically Hungarian public figures of Slovakia 
at the castle of Bratislava. It was for the first time that a Prime Minister of 
Slovakia declared that historic Hungary was part of the common past and 
that he understood why Trianon hurt Hungarians. This indicated that Slovak 
politicians were willing to make the link between Trianon and the long-term 
survival of the Hungarian minority. It had not been the case earlier. If the 
question occurred in public politics at all, Trianon meant the departure of 
Slovaks from Hungary, thus it was framed as a success story, just the oppo-
site of the trauma that Hungarians associated with it. 
Slovak historian Roman Holec and Hungarian historian László Szarka in the prog-



























Various Slovak media channels asked several intellectuals and public figures 
about the topic. TV channels broadcasted interviews and talks on Trianon 
and about the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Slovak authors published 
new books among which we shall primarily mention Roman Holec’s book 
Trianon, diadal és katasztrófa [Trianon, victory and catastrophy] written in 
a reader friendly style and Ondrej Ficeri’s A Trianon utáni Kassa [Kosice 
after Trianon]. This interest reached so far that an academic research group 
started working on the Trianon Treaty under the leadership of a professor 
of legal history Erik Štenpien at the Department of Law of the Pavol Jozef 
Šafárik University in Košice.
Outstanding experts, such as László Szarka, László Vörös and Štefan Šutaj, 
whose work cannot be labelled ethno-centric or nationalist, had the oppor-
tunity to talk of Trianon in prime time on television. On 3 June, the Slovak 
state television broadcast the discussion programme called Do križa, then 
hosted by Štefan Chrappa and Jaroslav Daniška, in which László Szarka 
and Roman Holec debated about currently relevant aspects of the Trianon 
phenomenon. Importantly, Roman Holec mentioned that he believed the 
Trianon treaty was unjust. 
Of course, in 2020 there were also some who remembered Trianon as a pos-
itive thing for Slovaks. For example, despite the erstwhile cultural associa-
tion, Matica Slovenská announced that the anniversary could be an occasion 
for learning about each other, several of their local branches organized fes-
tive events on 4 June. Moreover, one could also encounter explicitly an-
ti-Hungarian interpretations and publications, such as Edita Tarabčáková’s 
work bearing the curious title Sérelem érte a magyarokat? A valódi igazság 
Trianonról [Were there real injustice against Hungarians? The truth about 
Trianon], for example. Overall, the events reflected that Trianon has not be-
come an issue of primary importance for the majority society of Slovakia, 
yet it is also clear that there is a growing number of Slovaks who understand 
the sensitivity of Hungarians (both of those who live in Slovakia and of Hun-
garians in Hungary).
Veronika Szeghy-Gayer 
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Romania – Yet Another Centenary
2020 featured a new experience for the Romanian historical consciousness 
that explicitly related to Hungarians. The centenary celebrations of the Great 
Union in 2018 blended into the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Tri-
anon Peace Treaty. 
The symbolic year of Greater Romania was 1918. That was the year when 
Romania was granted Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania and it actually 
took hold of these territories in the following year. By 1920, only the interna-
tional sanctioning of state succession had been pending, and the integration 
of these newly acquired regions had already been under way. It was a sign of 
the pace of the integration process that temporary governing bodies, includ-
ing the Consiliul Dirigent of Transylvania formed in December 1918, were 
dissolved on 4 April 1920. However, the signing of the Treaty was clearly 
the culmination of this. Yet, for a long time, the anniversary of “Trianon” 
had only an indirect presence in the Romanian historical consciousness. In 
the traditional narrative on territorial expansion, independent achievements 
of the Romanians occupied the central stage. In this interpretation, Greater 
Romania was the outcome of the Romanian efforts, chiefly the participation 
of the army and the self-governance of the Romanian communities in Tran-
sylvania, as well as Bukovina and Bessarabia. International constellations 
and support further facilitated this process. The Treaty of Trianon and the 
other Paris Peace Treaties after World War I sanctioned these outcomes and 
achievements, thus, memory politics had hardly paid any attention to these 
documents and negotiations. At the same time, the anniversary of the as-
sembly at Alba Iulia gained so much importance that it became the national 
holiday of Romania in 1990. 
Thus, Romanian memory politics chiefly focused on the Great Union Day. 
The homogenizing historical discourse of the Romanian national commun-
ism of the post-World War II period reaffirmed this orientation. However, the 
year 2020 brought about some changes in this regard. Additional elements 
were added to the themes of the 2018 centenary celebrations – namely, the 
Great Union Day, the assessment of the past century of Romania, and the 
possibility that the Republic of Moldova might (re)join Romania. In 2020 
a shift occurred in this regard: the Romanian public paid more attention to 




























Souvenir with portraits of the Romanian signatories of the Peace Treaty
It seems that although the events of the centenary in Hungary played some 
role in this shift, the decisive factor was the domestic politics in Romania. 
The journals and published conference papers hardly ever influenced the 
wider public and the legislative bodies. However, this issue has been on the 
agenda of the Romanian politics for quite some time: Titus Corlățean, cur-
rently a senator representing the Social Democrats as well as a former min-
ister for foreign affairs, and some other members of the Senate submitted a 
legislative proposal in 2015 that would have designated the anniversary of 
Trianon as the day of remembrance. However, the proposal was withdrawn 
in the same year. Subsequently, an independent (formerly social democrat) 
representative, Bogdan Diaconu, also tried pushing through a proposal titled 
as “The day of Trianon and the struggle against the Hungarian oppression”, 
which was rejected by the parliament. However, by the autumn of 2019, 
developments – that included changes in the position of the Democratic Al-
liance of Hungarians and the mobilization of the Romanian nationalist vot-
ers – led to a situation where it seemed feasible for Corlățean to submit his 
proposal again. In the spring of 2020, President Klaus Iohannis also brought 
the issue to the agenda in an anti-Social Democrat and anti-Hungarian excla-
mation that received wider publicity.
The so-called “Trianon-Law” passed as a result of this patriotic bidding. 
Subsequent efforts of the president to prevent it caused only little delay and 
the law eventually came into force. The two chambers of the Romanian Par-
liament voted on it in the autumn of 2020, which meant  the only spectacular 
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 The celebration held by the Calea Neamului Association at Sfântu Gheorghe (Sepsisz-
entgyörgy) on 4 June 2020 (Photo: Csaba János Pozsony)
event that took place on the 100th anniversary. A chauvinist organization 
Asociația Calea Neamului had also organized the occupation of the cem-
etery in Úzvölgy and celebrated the signing of the Treaty in Sepsiszent-
györgy, one of the centres of Szeklerland region mostly inhabited by Hun-
garians. Notably, they refrained from showing or chanting anti-Hungarian 
slogans. The Hungarian government did not provoke Romanian chauvinists 
even though the Romanian minister for foreign affairs expressed that he was 
not happy for the Hungarian parliament to have nominated 2020 as the year 
of national togetherness. Budapest and the organizations of minority Hun-
garians in Transylvania commemorated the event, which had tragic conse-
quences for Hungary and the Hungarian nation-building in a moderate way.
Romanian historians and the Romanian Academy of Sciences facilitated the 
institutionalization of the Trianon issue. In fact, a large proportion of Roma-
nian historians and the Academy of Sciences are committed to Romanian 
nation-building. This was apparent on a number of occasions around the 
centenary of the birth of Greater Romania when the Academy opposed the 
idea that ethnic minorities should have autonomy and objected all interpre-
tations that criticized the Romanian national narrative on the Great Union 
Day.



























an-Aurel Pop, a renowned Transylvanian historian of the early period. As 
the rector of the Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, and as 
the president of the Romanian Academy of Sciences (since spring 2018) he 
spoke about the Romanian centenary, 1 December and Trianon on several 
occasions. He also published a number of opinion papers. In one of his talks 
given in 2017 he stated that the Trianon 100 Research Group of the Hungari-
an Academy of Sciences had been an anti-Romanian propaganda office. This 
statement was much talked about in Romanian media.  
Apart from academic texts, TV programmes and popular literature, a number 
of public monuments recall the birth of Greater Romania. In recent years, 
these have been installed or reinstalled to commemorate those personalities 
who played a key role in the events between 1918 and 1920. The list includes 
the bust and equestrian statue of King Ferdinand, ”the Unifier” inaugurated 
The cover of the special issue of the journal Historia
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in Carei (Nagykároly, 2015) and Oradea (Nagyvárad, 2019), respectively; 
the head of the wartime French military mission to Romania, General Henri 
Mathias Berthelot erected in Bucharest in 2018, and the busts of the “two 
friends of Romanians” Woodrow Wilson the President of the USA, and Em-
manuel de Martonne the French geographer who supported the arguments 
that Romanians brought up in Alba Iulia (2018); another monument for de 
Martonne in Oradea (2019) and the statue of General Gheorghe Mărdăres-
cu who commanded the Romanian army that occupied Budapest in 1919 - 
erected in Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár) in 2019. In the autumn of 2020, a series 
of postal stamps commemorated the treaties of Paris, including the Trianon 
Treaty. The Romanian National Bank also issued several memorial coins on 
the occasion of the centenary of the Great War and the Great Union Day. 
Notably, the Trianon Treaty is not among the events specifically recalled. 
The nationalist interpretation of Trianon was the logical consequence of the 
triumphalist approach of the national discourse about the Great Union. The 
outcome of the memory politics and events of the year was the link between 
Alba Iulia (Gyulafehérvár) and Trianon, which had been understated until 
present day, became fixed in public perception in Romania, too. Advocates 
of Romanian nation-building probably hoped by making 4 June a celebrated 
anniversary they will have one more occasion to stress the importance of the 
post-World War I status quo apart from the national holiday celebrated on 1 
December each year. This is a message that addresses all citizens of Roma-
nia (both the majority and minority groups) as well as Hungarians living in 
Hungary or elsewhere. 
Csaba Zahorán 
The Year of the Miracle Along the River Vistula
At the end of World War I, on 11 November 1911, an independent and sov-
ereign Polish state was created again, for the first time in 123 years. Thus, in 
the interwar period and after the systemic change of 1989, the most import-
ant national holiday in Poland was 11 November. The other national holiday 
of similar importance falls on 15 August. The latter day has multiple mean-
ings: on the one hand, Roman Catholics celebrate the day as the Assumption 



























these days, tens of thousands of people gathered at the square in front of 
the monastery of the Order of Saint Paul at Częstochowa or at the Benedic-
tine Monastery of Kalwaria Zebrzydowska near Krakow. After the systemic 
change, 15 August became an official holiday to celebrate. Since 1992 this 
has also been the day of the Polish Army since the Polish army defeated the 
Red Army near Warsaw this day in 1920. Considering the circumstances of 
the battle, no surprise that the religious event and the battle of historic impor-
tance have been intertwined. The stake at the battle of Warsaw was no less 
than the survival of the hardly two-year-old state and the Red Army outnum-
bered the Poles, thus victory was a miracle. In Polish memory politics the 
battle appears as the “Miracle at the Vistula” that saved Poland and Europe 
from the Bolshevik army. This is the event that Poland commemorated on 
15 August 2020. 
Take up arms! Join the voluntary army! 
Propaganda poster from the period of the Polish-Bolshevik War of 1920
The Polish nation celebrated the end of World War I as a victory. Thus, pre-
serving the status quo was a top priority for the political elite. Moreover, 
after having defeated and pushed back the Bolsheviks as well as acquiring 
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territories in the West (Greater Poland) and in the South (Silesia [in Polish: 
Śląsk] and the Zips [in Polish: Spisz]), this elite had regional ambitions. 
During 1920, Marshall Józef Piłsudski the “father of independence” defined 
his policy to preserve the sovereignty, as well as independence and integ-
rity. The central element was the way to ensure that the two neighbouring 
powers, Germany and Russia, would never be able to divide Poland among 
themselves. Piłsudski’s response was a plan for a Central European federa-
tion that, in his concept, would be the cooperation of nations that had lived 
in the former territory of the Jagellonian Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian 
Republic against Bolshevik Russia.
The Polish statesman believed that the interests of Poles, Ukrainians, Be-
larussians and Lithuanians were common. The federative structure that they 
imagined would have included Poles, Lithuanians and Belarussians (i.e. the 
former Lithuanian Grand Duchy) in the same state and a federation with 
an independent Ukraine, which was in the making. According to Piłsudski, 
this could have been realized exactly in the year 1920. However ambitious 
his plans were, he missed taking the Lithuanian national awakening and its 
anti-Polish content into consideration, and he also disregarded the fragility 
of the Ukrainian national consciousness as well as that Ukrainians did not 
perceive the Bolshevik threat as a fatal danger. At the same time, we shall 
recognize that if Piłsudski’s plan had been realized, there would have been 
a buffer zone set between Poland and the Soviet Union which came into 
existence soon thereafter. Eventually, the Peace Treaty signed in Riga on 
18 March 1921 created another framework. The buffer zone was divided 
between Poland and the Soviet Union and the Lithuanians, Belarussians and 
Ukrainians who landed on the Polish side, thus failed to receive autonomy. 
Therefore, when Piłsudski apologized for the Treaty to the Ukrainian units 
that fought along with him, it was not a gesture out of proportions. 
Yet, Piłsudski’s concept remained the baseline of the Polish foreign poli-
cy after 1989. The goal was to create or maintain a clear division between 
Russia and the nations mentioned above in political, economic and cultural 
terms. The Russian annexation of Crimea increased the level of Polish anxi-
ety to a level not seen in the last 100 years. Thus, in the course of the cente-
nary celebrations of 2020, memory politics focused on the Polish-Ukrainian 



























The statues of Charles de Gaulle, Józef Piłsudski, Pál Teleki and Simon Petljura in 
Skierniewice
The way the Hungarians’ role came to the foreground was an interesting 
sidestory of the memory politics of this alliance. It was for Pál Teleki’s 
first government that provided munitions’ supply to the Polish army, which 
proved decisive during the battle of Warsaw. In the past decades, a num-
ber of Polish settlements have inaugurated memorials to recall this support. 
Among these, one stands in front of the railway station of Skierniewice, 
where the cargo of arms reached. The plaquettes in the city of Warsaw and in 
Ossów commemorate the event, too. In 2020, new monuments were erected. 
First, the statue of Pál Teleki was unveiled in Krakow, then a new plaquette 
was presented in the small town of Brok, finally, a group of statues, that 
of Charles de Gaulle, Pál Teleki, Simon Petljura and Józef Piłsudski were 
erected in Skierniewice. The statues reprensent the group of politicians who 
provided real aid to Poland in the fight against the Bolsheviks. This was quite 
a unique contextualization of the post-Trianon Hungarian politics – this is a 
novelty in terms of the international context and not only if we juxtapose it 
with how Hungarians tend to perceive this history.
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The events of 1918 and 1920 are the foundations of the current Polish mem-
ory politics. They are the symbols of realizing and securing independence. 
Most importantly, those events are not only commemorated and celebrated, 
but also they serve the essence of their content resurface in the current do-
mestic and foreign policy. 
Miklós Mitrovits 
Referendum in Carinthia – A Major Trauma for Slovenes?
Slovenia commemorated 10 October 2020 as the day of the 100th anniver-
sary of the Carinthian plebiscite. For Slovenes, the referendum was a trau-
matic event as a result of which some areas, with a Slovenian majority were 
annexed to the new Republic of Austria. Consequently, the idea of uniting all 
Slovenes in one state, a goal defined in 1848, was not be realized after World 
War I. We may add that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes could 
not prevent Italy from taking the Western strip of the area that Slovenes 
inhabited, and there were villages with Slovenian population in the territo-
ry of post-Trianon Hungary, too. However, the Slovenian public considered 
Carinthia as the most important loss. The memory of this event is particular-
ly bitter because many Slovenes voted against joining the Kingdom of Serbs, 
the Croats and Slovenes, thus, against uniting with their fellow nationals.
After World War I, Slovenian General Rudolf Maister took Maribor and the 
part of Styria that lays between River Drava and Mur by force. This move 
played a key role in granting the Southern Slavic state sovereignty over 
territories of Prekmurje that used to belong to the Hungarian Kingdom. Ho-
w e ver, military intervention came too late in Carinthia. Great Powers ruled 
that there had to be a referendum in the greater part of the region where Slo-
venians were in majority. For this purpose, the area was divided into Zone A 
and Zone B. In the much larger Zone A, 59% of the voters preferred Austria 
with an exceptionally high, 95%, turnout. Since 70% of the inhabitants were 
Slovenes, at least one third of them must have also voted for joining Austria. 
Although doubts about the fairness of the referendum arose in several places, 
the Yugoslav government recognized that the result was too clear for repeat-
ing the vote. According to the terms agreed prior to the vote, in the northern 



























The areas of Carinthia indicated with brown were annexed by Austria. The darker 
parts designate the areas where the majority voted for joining Yugoslavia. 
In Slovenia, the centenary of the referendum was a major issue in public 
media and in the press in general. Experts of the events shared the results of 
their research in programmes and articles that attracted much attention. The 
representatives of the Slovenian minority in Carinthia had the opportunity to 
talk of the events of 1920, their current position and prospects. They high-
lighted the symbolic importance of the celebrations at Klagenfurt (Celovec). 
At that event, the Austrian president delivered his speech partly in Slove-
nian language. Although he mentioned that many Slovenes voted for joining 
Austria, he publicly apologized for the fact that Austria was late to act upon 
the constitutional rights theoretically granted to the Slovenian minority. This 
was the first instance of such a public declaration. 
Due to measures that were in place in order to prevent the spread of the 
pandemic, most conferences that would have discussed the referendum were 
cancelled or postponed. However, a series of monographic studies and pa-
pers appeared sheding light on many aspects that have not been analysed 
earlier. Among other things, these works detail the preparations regarding 
Carinthia during the Paris Peace Treaty negotiations and the importance of 
economic and infrastructural considerations in these. We also have a clear-
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er picture about the role of the Italian representatives and that there was a 
strong link between the case of Carinthia and South Tyrol. Recent research 
has foregrounded the decisive role of the Austrian representatives’ convin-
cing arguments that led to President Woodrow Wilson’s support for the refe-
rendum. 
Contemporary Austrian propaganda brochure
Authors who talked of the Germanization efforts also contributed to a better 
understanding of the circumstances of the referendum. These works high-
lighted the differences among Slovenian elites of the former provinces of 
Austria emphasizing that the Karavankas had not only been physical but 
also mental barriers among the Slovenes of Carinthia, Carniola and Styria. 
For decades, historians have been debating the weight of the application of 
military force in the outcome of the referendum. According to Slovenian 
historians, the key factors were Germanization, economic interests, and the 
successful Austrian propaganda – mostly carried out in Slovenian language 
– that intended to scare Slovenians with the prospect of being enlisted to the 




























Slovenes believe that Carinthia was the birthplace of the Slovenian people. 
The image of early Medieval Carinthia as a mythical state of Slavs has been 
at the centre of historical consciousness since the 19th century. As part of Ti-
to’s Yugoslavia, Slovenia annexed sizeable territories with a majority Slove-
nian population West of the pre-World War II borders, however, after World 
War II, Great Powers decided to keep the Austrian border unaltered. For 
Slovenians, this made the loss more painful and that is how it became the 
most significant historical trauma for them. Commemorative events reflected 
this. At the same time, we shall not forget that one tenth of historic Carinthia 
became part of Slovenia without any referendum. 
György Lukács B. 
Contemporary Yugoslav propaganda brochure
Translated by Róbert Balogh
